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1. Introduction
The problem of how to fairly divide a divisible good among agents who
value different parts of it distinctly has been thoroughly studied in many
areas of science over the last seventy years. The heterogeneous good is often
referred to as the cake (Steinhaus, 1948), and thus this problem is known
as cake-cutting (see Brams and Taylor, 1996, Robertson and Webb, 1998
and Moulin, 2004 for textbook references). This problem has multiple real-
life applications, which include the division of land, inheritances, and cloud
computing. Although fundamental breakthroughs have been achieved on the
construction of fair cake-cutting procedures, the question of which procedure
is fairer in practice has not yet been tackled. This paper reports the results
of an experiment that provides useful insights to help answer this question.
Let us start by clarifying what we mean by fair. Although several no-
tions of fairness have been proposed, two important ones stand out for their
intuitive formulation. The first one is proportionality, proposed by Steinhaus
himself. A division of the cake among n agents is proportional if every agent
obtains at least what she considers to be 1/n of the cake. The second one
is envy-freeness, proposed by Gamow and Stern (1958) and Foley (1967). A
division of the cake is envy-free if no agent prefers the allocation received by
any other agent over hers. If the entire cake is allocated, any division that is
envy-free is also proportional.1 Proportionality and envy-freeness are often
considered “the two most important tests of equity” (Moulin, 1995, p. 166).
The literature has developed procedures that produce envy-free cake divi-
sions when all agents report their preferences over the cake pieces truthfully.
We will refer to these as envy-free procedures. Although the ones used for the
division of a cake among two agents have been known and used since ancient
times, all others rely on complex algorithms which are far from straightfor-
ward to general audiences: the Selfridge-Conway procedure for three agents
is a case in point. These procedures obtain envy-free allocations at the cost
of being hard to understand by the audiences for whom they are intended.
If those procedures are not perceived as envy-free in practice (or at least
fairer than proportional ones), there would be little support for their im-
plementation in practice. Therefore, the first key question is whether those
algorithms produce allocations that are not only fair in theory, but that are
also perceived to be fair in practice.
Furthermore, the envy-freeness of these division procedures can only be
guaranteed if the agents report their preferences truthfully. If agents strategi-
cally misrepresent their preferences, an allocation with envy can be obtained
1Envy-freeness and proportionality are equivalent in the two-agent case.
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as a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game associated to envy-free procedures
(Braˆnzei et al., 2016). In fact, as we show in Lemma 4, envy can rationally
emerge in envy-free procedures even when only one agent lies. Therefore, a
second key question is whether cake-cutting procedures are manipulated in
practice, and whether such manipulations, if they exist, significantly increase
envy.
Our third and final key question is whether agents can successfully learn
their opponents’ preferences through repeated interaction. This question is
related to the previous two in that an agent needs some information about
their opponents’ preferences to successfully manipulate a cake-cutting proce-
dure. An agent can acquire this valuable information through experimenta-
tion, i.e. varying her strategies over time and observing her opponents’ best
responses to them. If agents do not learn through experimentation, there is
little concern about the manipulation of cake-cutting procedures in environ-
ments in which agents’ preferences are privately known, and thus no concern
about the emergence of envy in otherwise envy-free procedures.
We tackle these three questions by means of a lab experiment. In the
experiment we study:
1. the perceived fairness of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting pro-
cedures,
2. the extent to which agents manipulate those procedures, and
3. whether agents learn their opponents’ preferences and use that infor-
mation to their advantage.
We consider the most popular cake-cutting procedures and compare their
theoretical properties against their real performance in the lab. The proce-
dures we consider are:
• For 2 agents: symmetric and asymmetric cut-and-choose;
• For 3 agents: Knaster-Banach last diminisher, (a discrete adaptation
of) Dubins-Spanier moving knife, and Selfridge-Conway;
• For 4 agents: Knaster-Banach last diminisher, (a discrete adaptation
of) Dubins-Spanier moving knife, and Even-Paz.
These cake-cutting procedures, described in detail in the next section,
are well-known in the literature because they all achieve proportional alloca-
tions. Furthermore, the asymmetric and symmetric cut-and-choose and the
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Selfridge-Conway procedures are even envy-free.2
In the experiment, 131 subjects divide 8 cakes using the aforementioned
procedures versus automata agents who play truthfully. Agents divide each
cake 7 times in what we call rounds, during which their opponents’ pref-
erences remain constant. This gives agents incentives to try to learn their
opponents’ preferences. In addition, during the final two rounds agents are
directly told their opponents’ preferences, so that we are able to differentiate
between manipulations made to learn the opponents’ preferences and those
made to directly increase the subjects’ immediate payoff. Subjects observe
which share of the cake they get in each round and the value (in their own
eyes) of their opponents’ shares. This way, subjects can assess the fairness
of the allocations received.
At the end of the experiment, agents complete a questionnaire which asks
them to rank the fairness of the division procedures and allows them to give
their feedback on their experience with the cake-cutting procedures. Agents
are also asked which procedure was the fairest and why.
1.1. Overview of Results
We find that all cake-cutting procedures are very frequently manipulated,
in fact at least half of the time (subsection 5.3). As a consequence, envy-free
procedures generate envy. Envy is generated in 7% of cases when using the
asymmetric cut-and-choose procedure in which the subject cuts the cake, in
18% of cases when using the symmetric cut-and-choose procedure in which
both subjects cut the cake, and in 28% of cases when using Selfridge-Conway.
However, these procedures still generate substantially less envy than their
proportional counterparts, which generate envy in over 50% of cases (sub-
section 5.2).
The difference in envy is noticed by the subjects. Envy-free procedures
receive a significantly better fairness ranking than their counterparts (over
80% of subjects view them as fair, compared to less than 50% for their
proportional counterparts). Moreover, agents were at least three times more
likely to rank envy-free procedures as the fairest ones than proportional ones
(subsection 5.1).
Overall, the experimental results provide support for the use of the cut-
and-choose and Selfridge-Conway procedures, and more generally, of envy-
free cake-cutting procedures. These procedures are manipulated in prac-
tice just as much as their proportional counterparts, but nonetheless they
2We do not include an envy-free procedure for four agents because the only finite
one known to date, proposed by Aziz and Mackenzie (2016) in a seminal paper, is too
complicated to be implemented in the lab since it requires up to 203 cake cuts.
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generate substantially less envy. As a consequence, they are perceived as
significantly fairer than their proportional counterparts.
We find some evidence of successful learning, in particular in both of
the cut-and-choose procedures, the Knaster-Banach last diminisher, and to
some extent in Selfridge-Conway. Surprisingly, we observe that more knowl-
edge does not always yield higher payoffs. This is because agents use that
knowledge to manipulate the cake-cutting procedures in the wrong way. In
particular, they try to follow simple heuristics that worked in the past, such
as cutting the cake a bit more to the right, which may be harmful in other
procedures in which the optimal manipulation was to cut the cake a bit more
to the left. Overall, we observe that knowledge significantly decreases the
level of truth-telling behavior and envy (subsections 5.3 and 5.4).
Moreover, we find that about 80% of the agents do manipulations that
are obviously harmful to them, even in the simple cut-and-choose procedure.
For example, they cut the cake at a certain location x, see that their partner
chooses the right piece, and then, at the next play against the same partner,
cut to the left of x — which is guaranteed to result in a smaller piece for
them (subsection 5.5).
Structure of the article. Section 2 presents an overview of related exper-
iments and case studies. Section 3 introduces the cake-cutting model and
our testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents our experimental design. Section
5 discusses our findings. Section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
2.1. Laboratory Experiments
All fair division experiments that we know deal with discrete indivisible
goods and/or a homogeneous divisible good such as money. This is quite
different than our setting, where there is a continuous heterogeneous divisible
good. With indivisible goods, the user input usually consists of a ranking of
the goods or an assignment of a monetary value to each good. In contrast,
cake-cutting has a spatial element — the participants have to decide where
exactly to cut the cake. Since the user interface, user experience and potential
manipulations are different, we cannot automatically expect the findings of
previous experiments to hold in our setting too. Keeping this in mind, we
survey previous lab experiments and compare their findings with ours.
Sophisticated versus simple. In some experiments, the main research
question is which procedure yields more user satisfaction? In particular,
do users prefer the allocations generated by sophisticated and provably-fair
procedures, to the allocations generated by simple and intuitive procedures?
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Schneider and Kra¨mer (2004) compare the simple divide-and-choose pro-
cedure to the more sophisticated Adjusted-Knaster and Proportional-Knaster
procedures, for allocating indivisible goods with monetary compensation.
They find that, if the participants truthfully adhere to the protocol, then the
sophisticated mechanisms perform better than divide-and-choose in terms of
efficiency and fairness. However, if the participants are allowed to strategi-
cally deviate from the protocol, then their performance declines and becomes
comparable to divide-and-choose.
Dupuis-Roy and Gosselin (2009) compare five procedures for indivisible
object allocation (Sealed Bid Knaster, Adjusted Winner, Adjusted Knaster,
Division by Lottery and Descending Demand) to the allocation with the high-
est mutual satisfaction scores (which they find using genetic search). They
find that the fair division procedures yield allocations that are rather unsatis-
factory to humans. They attribute this to two factors which are often ignored
by fair division procedures: temporal fluctuation of human preferences, and
non-additivity of valuations.
In a different experiment, Dupuis-Roy and Gosselin (2011) compare three
simple algorithms for allocating indivisible goods (Strict Alternation, Bal-
anced Alternation and Divide-and-Choose) to four provably-fair algorithms
(Compensation Procedure, Price Procedure, Adjusted Knaster and Adjusted
Winner). They find that, counter-intuitively, the simple algorithms produce
significantly fairer allocations.
In contrast, other studies emphasize the advantage of sophisticated fair
division procedures. Bassi (2006) studied division of homogeneous resources
using Crawford’s negotiation procedures, and found that his procedures in-
duce even selfish players to act fairly. Gal et al. (2016) used the spliddit.org
website (Goldman and Procaccia, 2015) to study division of rooms and rent,
and found that their maximin procedure performs significantly better than
a procedure that selects an arbitrary envy-free allocation.
Our findings are in line with the latter studies. Despite the strategic
manipulation by humans, the final outcomes of the envy-free procedures (in
particular, Selfridge-Conway) are significantly fairer and more satisfactory
than the non-envy-free procedures. Thus, at least in our setting, the extra-
complexity of the procedures pays back in fairness.
Strategic manipulation. In some experiments, the main goal is to check
the strategic behavior of subjects: Do they try to manipulate the protocol?
Do they manipulate successfully? And how does the manipulation affect the
protocol outcomes?
All previous experiments that we know of found that agents do try to
manipulate. However, the effect of this manipulation on the outcome de-
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pends on the protocol: in simple auction-based protocols, manipulation lead
to highly inefficient outcomes, where no deal was done even though a deal
was possible (Daniel et al., 1998; Parco and Rapoport, 2004). Using more
structured conflict-resolution procedures (such as Adjusted Winner) did not
eliminate manipulation, but it did lead to a much more efficient outcome
(Daniel and Parco, 2005; Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer, 2010).
In our experiment, too, we find that subjects try to manipulate the pro-
tocol, and the manipulative behavior increases over time. We also find that
some procedures are easier to manipulate than others. In particular, Divide-
and-Choose and the Knaster-Banach last diminisher procedure are particu-
larly prone to manipulative behavior. This might be due to their simplicity
— procedures that are easier to understand are also easier to manipulate.
Strategic behavior was studied extensively in other markets besides fair
division, particularly in matching markets (Castillo and Dianat, 2016). A
remarkable finding in such experiments is that people try to manipulate
even when the mechanism is truthful and thus manipulation cannot help
(Artemov et al., 2017; Hassidim et al., 2016, 2017; Rees-Jones, 2017; Parco
and Rapoport, 2004).
In our experiment this finding is even more pronounced: about 80% of
all subjects tried at least one manipulation that is strictly dominated and
obviously results in a smaller payoff for them.
Different desiderata. In some experiments, the main research question is
what desiderata are more important to users? Early experiments checked this
question in the simple setting of dividing money (a homogeneous resource).
Many experiments check whether, in an inherently unfair game such as the
ultimatum game, subjects prefer to accept an unfair offer than to accept
nothing (Gu¨th, 1995; Lopomo and Ok, 2001; Werner et al., 2003).
Other experiments check whether, when dividing money among others,
people prefer a fair inefficient division to an unfair division that is more effi-
cient (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr et al., 2006; Herreiner and Puppe,
2007). It was found that such preferences depend on psychological and cul-
tural factors (e.g. economics students choose differently than law students).
Later experiments asked similar questions in more complex settings, in-
volving allocation of indivisible objects (Herreiner and Puppe, 2009, 2010).
These findings are orthogonal to our experiment, in which the fairness
desiderata are fixed and the goal is to check which procedure attains them
most efficiently.
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2.2. Other experiments
Case studies. Besides lab experiments, several fair division procedures
were applied to real-life cases.
Flood (1958) studied a case of dividing gift parcels using the Knaster
algorithm, and Pratt and Zeckhauser (1990) applied an auction-based divi-
sion algorithm to allocate silver heirlooms. They found that, although the
algorithm was decentralized and most participants did not fully understand
it or the preference information desired, it handled all major considerations
well and was regarded as equitable.
Several counter-factual studies checked the feasibility of using the Ad-
justed Winner (AW) protocol (Brams and Taylor, 1996) for resolving interna-
tional disputes, particularly the Camp David Accords (Brams and Togman,
1996), the Spratly Islands controversy (Brams and Denoon, 1997) and the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Massoud, 2000).
Tijs and Branzei (2004) describe some case studies of dividing the profits
of cooperation between partners, in light of concepts from cooperative game
theory, such as the Shapley value.
Kurokawa et al. (2015) applied a randomized leximin mechanism for allo-
cating public-school classrooms to charter-schools. Unfortunately, the initia-
tor of this algorithm backed away so the mechanism has not been deployed
yet, but the partial collaboration emphasized the importance of intuitive and
easy-to-understand fairness guarantees.
Computerized Simulations. Computerized simulations of fair division al-
gorithms were used to test properties of such algorithms that are difficult to
analyze theoretically. Walsh (2011) used simulations to compare the welfare
properties of online vs. offline cake-cutting algorithms. Cavallo (2012) used
simulations to test his mechanism for redistribution of VCG payments. Dick-
erson et al. (2014) studied fair allocation of indivisible goods using comput-
erized simulations. They show that, when the number of goods is sufficiently
large (relative to the number of agents), envy-free allocations are likely to
exist.
2.3. Strategic Fair Division
There are several theoretical studies regarding the strategic properties
of cake-cutting protocols (Braˆnzei and Miltersen, 2013; Braˆnzei et al., 2016),
and various sophisticated protocols that are truthful under some assumptions
on the valuations. See Nicolo` and Yu (2008), Mossel and Tamuz (2010), Maya
and Nisan (2012), Chen et al. (2013), Bei et al. (2017) and Bei et al. (2018).
The repeated-cake-cutting setting has been studied by Delgosha and Go-
hari (2012). They studied ways by which the cutter can exploit her knowledge
8
of the chooser’s preferences in order to improve her own welfare. Recently,
Tamuz et al. (2018) continued this line of work by suggesting new division
protocols that are non-exploitable, i.e. a risk-averse cutter cannot improve
her welfare using information from previous interactions.
Our work complements these theoretic works in that we study the strate-
gies actually used by human subjects when they play as cutters.
3. Theory
We consider a standard setup based on Procaccia (2016). A cake-cutting
problem ([0, 1], N, (vi)i∈N) is a triple where:
• [0, 1] is the cake,
• N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents interested in the cake, and
• vi is the valuation function of agent i, which maps a given subinterval
I ⊆ [0, 1] to the value assigned to it by agent i, vi(I).
We write vi(x, y) as a shorthand for vi([x, y]). We assume that vi satisfies
the following standard properties. For every i ∈ N :
1. For every point x ∈ [0, 1], vi(x, x) = 0.
2. For every subinterval I, vi(I) ≥ 0.
3. For any two disjoint subintervals I, I ′, vi(I) + vi(I ′) = vi(I ∪ I ′)
We refer to a finite union of disjoint intervals as a piece of cake. An
allocation A is a partition of [0, 1] into n ordered, pairwise-disjoint pieces of
cake A = (A1, . . . , An) such that A1 ∪ . . . ∪ An = [0, 1]. We only consider
non-wasteful allocations. In a non-strategic framework in which all agents
reveal their true valuation function, a procedure is a function that takes a
cake-cutting problem as input and returns an allocation. We normalize the
valuation functions so that vi(0, 1) = 1.
3.1. Division Procedures
We consider the following procedures to divide a cake among two agents.
Asymmetric cut-and-choose (2ACC). Agent 1 cuts the cake into two
equally-valued pieces, i.e. two pieces [0, x1) and [x1, 1] such that v1(0, x1) =
v1(x1, 1) = 1/2. Agent 2 then chooses her preferred piece, and agent 1
receives the remaining piece. Formally, if v2(0, x1) ≥ v2(x1, 1), then set
A2 = [0, x1), A1 = [x1, 1]; otherwise set A1 = [0, x1), A2 = [x1, 1].
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Symmetric cut-and-choose (2SCC). Both agents cut the cake into two
equally-valued pieces by choosing xi such that vi(0, xi) = vi(xi, 1) = 1/2. Let
agent 1 be the one who chooses the lowest cut point x1 ≤ x2 without loss
of generality. Then, agent 1 receives the piece A1 = [0,
x1+x2
2
), and agent 2
receives the piece A2 = [
x1+x2
2
, 1].
Both 2ACC and 2SCC have been used and studied since biblical times,
yet they are only defined for the division of cake among two agents. Now
we define three procedures for dividing cake among three or more players.
The first of these is the last diminisher procedure suggested by Knaster and
Banach.
Last diminisher for n agents (nLD). Given a cake [y, 1], agent 1 chooses
a cut x1 so that v1(y, x1) = v1(y, 1)/n. Agent 2 now has the right, but is not
obliged, to choose x2 < x1. Whatever she does, agent 3 has the right, without
obligation, to further diminish the already diminished (or not diminished)
piece too, and so on up to n. The rule obliges the last diminisher (say agent
i) who chose the cut xi to take as her allocation Ai = [y, xi). Agent i is
disposed of, and the remaining n − 1 persons start the same game with the
remainder of the cake [xi, 1]. When there is only one agent left, she receives
the unclaimed piece of cake.
A similar procedure to nLD is the moving-knife of Dubins and Spanier
(1961), in which agents cut the cake simultaneously rather than sequentially.
Here we describe a discrete adaptation of it.
Dubins-Spanier for n agents (nDS). Given a cake [y, 1], each agent si-
multaneously cuts the cake at a point xi such that vi(y, xi) = 1/n. The agent
i∗ who made the leftmost cut exits with the piece Ai∗ = [y, xi∗ ]. Agent i∗ is
disposed of, and the remaining n − 1 persons start the same game with the
remainder of the cake [xi∗ , 1]. When there is only one agent left, she receives
the unclaimed piece of cake.
An alternative procedure was suggested by Even and Paz (1984) that
improves on nLD in that it requires fewer cuts to achieve a proportional
allocation.3 The idea of this procedure is to divide the original cake cutting
problem into two disjoint ones at each step.
Even-Paz for n agents (nEP). For the sake of clarity assume that n is a
power of 2. Given a cake [y, z], all agents choose cuts xi such that vi(y, xi) =
3The run-time complexity of the Even-Paz procedure is O(n log n), whereas the one of
Knaster-Banach last diminisher is O(n2).
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vi(y, z)/2. We let x
∗ be the median cut, i.e. the bn/2cth cut. Then the
procedure breaks the cake-cutting problem into two: all agents who choose
cuts xi ≤ x∗ are to divide the cake [y, x∗), whereas all agents who chose cuts
above x∗ are to divide the cake [x∗, z]. Each half is divided recursively among
the n/2 partners assigned to it. When the procedure is called with a singleton
set of agents {i} and an interval I it assigns Ai = I.
The last three procedures nDS, nLD and nEP can be adapted to divide
a cake among any number of agents. Our last procedure is only suitable for
dividing cake among 3 agents. It differs from the previous procedures in that
it generates allocations that are not contiguous. Furthermore, it requires not
one but two cake cuts to be made at the same time.
Selfridge-Conway (3SC). Agent 1 cuts the cake into three pieces of equal
value to her: I1, I2, I3; so that v1(Ii) = 1/3. Agent 2 divides the piece of
highest value to her, say I1 into I
′
1 and T = I1 \ I ′1, so that the value of
I ′1 is the same of the second most valuable piece, say I2: v2(I
′
1) = v2(I2).
We separate the original cake into the modified cake C ′ = C \ T and the
trimmings T . First we allocate C ′. Let agent 3 choose and take her favorite
piece among I ′1, I2, I3. If she chooses I
′
1, let agent 2 choose any remaining
piece; but if agent 3 chooses I2 or I3, then give I
′
1 to agent 2 without letting
her choose. Agent 1 receives the leftover piece.
Now we assign T . Let i ∈ {2, 3} be the player who obtained I ′1, and j the
other one. Agent j splits T into three parts of equal value to her. Now agent
i, 1, and j choose a piece of T in that specified order.
3.2. Fairness Properties
We consider the following fairness properties of allocations.
Definition 1. An allocation A is proportional if each agent gets at least 1/n
of the cake according to her own evaluation, i.e. if ∀i ∈ N : vi(Ai) ≥ 1/n.
Definition 2. An allocation A is envy-free if no agent prefers another agent’s
share, i.e. ∀i, j ∈ N : vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj).4
In our setup, envy-freeness implies proportionality, while the converse is
true only for the case of two agents. A procedure is envy-free or proportional
if, for every cake-cutting problem, it produces an allocation that is envy-free
or proportional, respectively. The following lemma summarizes the well-
known fairness properties of these procedures, and thus is stated without
proof.
4This notions should not be confused with procedural envy-freeness or anonymity, which
requires that the procedure treats agents symmetrically (Nicolo` and Yu, 2008).
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Lemma 1. 2ACC, 2SCC, nDS, nLD, nEP and 3SC are all proportional.
2ACC, 2SCC, and 3SC are envy-free. nDS, nLD, and nEP are not envy-
free.
The previous lemma gives us our first hypothesis. Namely, when dividing
a cake among three agents,
Hypothesis 1. Agents perceive the allocations received under 3SC as fairer
than those received under 3DS and 3LD.
This is an important hypothesis to test because it is evident that the
envy-freeness of 3SC comes at the cost of being considerably more complex
than 3DS or 3LD. Therefore, if 3SC is not considered a fairer option than 3DS
and 3LD, then there will be little support for its use in real-life applications.
3.3. Incentive Properties
Another important goal of cake-cutting procedures is to give incentives to
agents to reveal their true (privately known) valuation function to a mediator
who, after receiving the report from all agents, conducts a division procedure.
The valuation function is partially revealed via a series of cake cuts or choices
between pieces of cake. Although the mediator does not know the valuations,
we assume that every agent knows the other agents’ valuations.
In a strategic framework, given a cake [0, 1] and a set of agents N , a
procedure p is a function from the revealed valuation function of each agent
to an allocation A. We write pi(vi, v−i) = Ai to denote the cake allocated to
agent i by procedure p, where v−i denotes the reported valuation functions
of all other agents except i. We use the following standard property to study
which procedures are robust to strategic behavior.
Definition 3. The procedure p is strategy-proof if for every agent i, every
collection of valuation functions (vi, v−i), and every other valuation function
v′i,
vi(pi(vi, v−i)) ≥ vi(pi(v′i, v−i)) (1)
Note that the definition is a strict one: a procedure is strategy-proof only
if behaving truthfully is a dominant strategy for every player.5 Therefore, it
is not surprising that:
Lemma 2. 2ACC, 2SCC, nDS, nLD, nEP and 3SC are all not strategy-proof.
5This is the standard notion of strategy-proofness in mechanism design. For a weaker
notion in the context of cake-cutting, see Brams et al. (2006, 2008).
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Lemma 2 is also well-known; Brams et al. (2006) in particular discuss
many examples of how all these procedures can be manipulated.
A related question is how much agents can gain by strategic behavior
compared to their guaranteed payoff obtained by truth-telling in any of the
procedures we have described. We answer this question by considering the
notion of -strategy-proofness, which has recently been suggested in the lit-
erature (Menon and Larson, 2017). In layman terms, a cake-cutting pro-
cedure is -strategy-proof if there is no cake-cutting problem for which a
misrepresentation of preferences guarantees more than  utility compared to
truth-telling.6 Ideally, a proportional procedure should have an  = 0, and
in the worst case a procedure would have  = n−1
n
: this means that truthful
behavior guarantees an agent 1
n
, whereas lying yields the maximum utility
possible (1). Unfortunately, we show that all the procedures we consider can
offer the largest incentives for preference manipulation.
Lemma 3. The procedures 2ACC, 2SCC, nDS, nLD, nEP, 3SC are n−1
n
strategy-proof and this is tight.
We postpone the constructive proof of Lemma 3 to the Appendix.
These two lemmata suggest that if agents know their opponents’ pref-
erences in real-life cake-cutting, they should not behave truthfully if the
cake-cutting problem admits a successful manipulation. This is our second
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Agents who know their opponents’ preferences do not behave
truthfully in 2ACC, 2SCC, nDS, nLD, nEP and 3SC.
The assumption that agents know their partners’ valuations is a strong
one, yet necessary for agents to manipulate the procedure to their advantage
with certainty of success. Without such knowledge, an agent might perform
a manipulation that will decrease its utility. Therefore, in the fair division
literature, it is often claimed that strategic manipulation is not an issue when
people do not know their partners’ preferences (see e.g. Gal et al. (2016)).
However, in real life, agents may have a partial knowledge about their
partners’ preferences, particularly if they have interacted with those part-
ners previously. In those cases, an agent is able to learn the other agents’
valuations through experimentation, i.e. choosing different strategies each
interaction in order to eventually improve their own allocation. This simple
observation provides us with our final hypothesis.
6Formally, for any  ∈ [0, 1], the procedure p is -strategy-proof if for every agent i,
every collection of valuations functions (vi, v−i), and every other valuation function v′i,
vi(pi(vi, v−i)) ≥ vi(pi(v′i, v−i))− .
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Hypothesis 3. Agents who do not know their opponents’ preferences but
who repeatedly interact with them, successfully learn their opponents’ pref-
erences and do not behave truthfully in 2ACC, 2SCC, 3SC, nDS, nLD, nEP
and 3SC.
3.4. Fairness and Incentives
It is important to note a dependency between our three hypotheses. Hy-
pothesis 1 states that 3SC is perceived as fairer than 3LD and 3DS since
it generates envy-free allocations. However, this envy-freeness is guaranteed
only when all agents report their preferences truthfully. In contrast, Hy-
potheses 2 and 3 state that people do not behave truthfully. If all agents do
not behave truthfully, then in general, all three procedures discussed — 3SC,
3LD and 3DS — generate envy (Braˆnzei et al., 2016). However, hypothesis
1 still holds if the procedures are used by a population in which a fraction α
of agents behave truthfully. Then 3SC guarantees envy-freeness in at least α
cases, and thus it is reasonable to expect that it would still be perceived as
fairer than 3LD and 3DS. As a consequence, Hypothesis 1 extends to cases
in which a constant fraction of the agents behave truthfully.7
A related interesting question is whether envy can be generated in 3SC
when only one agent misreports her preferences, while the other agents are
truthful. This question is particularly relevant to our experimental setting,
since in our setting the computerized agents are truthful so only the sin-
gle human subject might act strategically.8 We answer this question in the
affirmative by showing that:
Lemma 4. Envy can be generated in 3SC with just one agent misrepresenting
her preferences. This agent achieves a higher payoff at the cost of being
envious.
Proof. We present an instance and a corresponding strategy for agent 1 who
is assumed to be strategic and tries to maximize her utility when competing
with two truthful agents. We show that agent 1 will end up envious of
another agent, although he will achieve higher utility than what he would
get by behaving truthfully. We focus on the action of agent 1 at the beginning
of the process, when he is asked to split the cake in three pieces. We consider
7The fraction α is in fact not constant but specific to each procedure. However, from
our lab experiment we found that the fraction of agents who behave truthfully in 3SC
(45%) is larger than in 3DS (40%) and 3LD (16%), and thus it is safe to expect that 3SC
is indeed perceived fairer than 3DS and 3LD.
8Braˆnzei et al. 2016 proved that envy can be generated in Nash equilibrium of 3SC, but
their proof crucially relies on the assumption that all three agents behave untruthfully.
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this to be the strategy of agent 1; w.l.o.g. we ignore subsequent actions in the
analysis as the only other choice that agent 1 makes is to select a part of the
trimmings close to the end of the process, and it is clear that her incentives
at that point are aligned with behaving truthfully and getting the part that
is most valuable to her.
Consider a cake [0, 1], which comprises 6 parts. The preferences of the
agents are described by the valuations in Table 1; agents are assumed to have
uniform valuations within each of these parts.  denotes a very small positive
constant.
Table 1: Agents’ preferences such that under 3SC agent 1’s optimal strategy makes her
envious.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Agent 1 0 1/3  1/3−   1/3− 
Agents 2 and 3 1/6 1/6 1/3 0 1/3 0
Truthful behavior for agent 1 would imply that he divides the cake at
three equally valued pieces, i.e., the first piece contains parts 1 and 2, the
second piece contains parts 3 and 4, and the third piece contains parts 5,
and 6. This split would result in utility 1/3 for agent 1 as there would
essentially be no trimming and each of the other agents would obtain one
of these parts. We claim that the split in three pieces comprising parts 1-4,
5, and 6, respectively, is an optimal strategy for agent 1 when others are
truthful, under which he ends up getting utility strictly higher than 1/3 but
is envious of one of the other two agents.
We first show that the split in pieces 1-4, 5, and 6, is a better response for
agent 1 than behaving truthfully, yet makes him envious of another agent.
Indeed, under this split, agent 2 will trim the first piece so that the trimmings
comprise parts 1 and 2. Agents 2 and 3 will first choose pieces 3-4 (the
trimmed piece), and 5, respectively, leaving part 6 for agent 1. The trimmings
T will be split in three equal parts, for which agent 1 will have value 0, 1/9,
and 2/9, respectively. Whoever got the trimmed piece, 3-4, will first select
the third part of the trimmings, leaving the second one for agent 1. Overall,
agent 1’s allocation has value 1
3
−  + 1
9
= 4
9
−  > 1
3
, yet he is envious of
the agent who got the trimmed part, as his allocated pieces have total value
1
3
+ 2
9
= 5
9
to agent 1.
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It remains to show that the split in pieces 1-4, 5, and 6 is an optimal
strategy (the one that results in the highest utility) for agent 1. We can prove
this under certain assumptions on the behavior of the agents that guarantee
consistency. The proof involves a case-analysis on all possible strategies of
agent 1. We move this part of the proof to the Appendix.
4. Experiment
4.1. Design
The subject divides a cake with 1, 2, or 3 other agents. The other agents
are automated; they are programmed to cut the cake truthfully. Fixing the
behavior of the other agents in this fashion is necessary in order to test
our hypotheses. The subject divides one cake using each of the division
procedures we have described. The subject is not told that the other agents
are automata that behave truthfully.
The cake-cutting occurs in the following order: 2ACC, 2SCC, 3DS, 4DS,
3LD, 4LD, 4EP, and 3SC. That is, the subjects divide 8 cakes. This particular
order was chosen so that subjects solve the easiest problems first. In the first
7 procedures the subjects need to move just one knife (in 3SC subjects move
two), and same procedures in which just the number of subjects varies (like
3DS-4DS and 3LD-4LD) are played consecutively to make it easier for the
subjects.
We change the names of the procedures to make it easier for the subjects
to understand them. We use the following names: I Cut You Choose (for
ACC), Cut Middle (for SCC), Leftmost Leaves (for nDS), Last Challenger
(for nLD), Super Fast (for 4EP) and Super Fair (for 3SC). We choose the
name Super Fair to emphasize that this procedure is mathematically designed
to produce a fair allocation. Admittedly, this biases the subjects to rank
this procedure higher in a scale of fairness. Yet, whenever scientists have
applied allocation mechanisms in practice, they explicitly emphasize that one
can show that such procedures are fairer.9 Thus, it is likely that the same
approach would be used if the Selfridge-Conway procedure was to be applied
in practice. As we will see, 3SC is highly ranked with regard to fairness
because subjects realize that it generates envy-free allocations in most cases,
9For example, the introduction of the deferred acceptance mechanism in Boston was
accompanied by a campaign informing the public that the new allocation method was
non-manipulable and in a sense fairer (Pathak, 2018). Similarly, the fair division website
Spliddit.com tells its users that its division methods achieve specific fairness guarantees
such as envy-freeness.
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so there is little concern that our findings with respect to fairness are solely
due to the chosen name.
Each cake is divided 7 times. We call each of these divisions a round.
During the first five rounds, the subject does not know the other agents’ val-
uations. In the remaining two rounds, the subject observes the automata’s
valuations. We give subjects 5 rounds to experiment and learn their op-
ponents’ valuations. The valuations of the subject and the automata are
constant during the 7 rounds in each procedure, but they change once the
agents move to the next procedure. The subject makes the first cut in all
procedures that are sequential.
In all procedures, the cake is a line and the subjects’ and automated
agents’ valuations are normalized so that vi(0, 1) = 120. In other words,
the subject and the automata can obtain a maximum of 120 points if they
obtain all of their desired parts of the cake. We chose 120 because it is easily
divisible by 2, 3, and 4. Subjects are shown their valuations on the computer
screen. Their valuations are given by a set of subintervals which are deemed
desirable, and another set which are not (described in the Appendix). All
desired intervals of the same length yield the same payoff; such valuations
are known as piecewise uniform. The cake can only be cut in a position x so
that vi(0, x) equals an integer number between 0 and 120. A representative
screen that subjects observe during the experiment is shown in Figure 1.
The graphical interface can be downloaded from our website.
Figure 1: An example of our experimental interface. The cake is depicted as a brown line,
while the desirable parts of the subject are emphasized with a green color.
Each subject has 7 minutes to complete the 7 rounds of each procedure. If
they do not take any action after the time is over they receive 0 points for the
remaining rounds. The clock pauses each time the subject moves to the next
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round, and she selects when to start each round. The time constraint was
almost never binding in the real experiment. After completing each round,
subjects are told (in the top right corner of the graphical interface) what
share of cake they got, and the valuation of the shares that the automated
players received, calculated by the valuation function of the subjects. This is
crucial for subjects to be able to properly assess the fairness of the division
procedure.
We choose the valuations so that strategic behavior yields substantial
benefits over truthful behavior. The valuations are described in the Ap-
pendix. The subjects are given the suggestion to cut the cake truthfully, but
are also explicitly told that they can choose another strategy that may give
them more or less points than the truthful one.
After cutting all the cakes, subjects are asked to rank the perceived fair-
ness of the procedures on a scale from 1 (very fair) to 4 (very unfair).10
Subjects are also asked which of all the procedures was the fairest in their
opinion and why. They are also asked whether 3SC was the fairest procedure
of them all and whether 4EP was an easier procedure to use. We also ask
them if they would have preferred to bargain directly with their opponents
in a decentralized fashion. Subjects also give their comments freely in a
textbox.
4.2. Payment
At the end of the experiment, 2 rounds are randomly selected from all
procedures, and subjects are paid the number of points they obtained in both
procedures divided by 10, in pounds. In addition, subjects receive a fixed
£5 payment for showing up. For example, if in the two randomly selected
rounds the subject obtains 120 and 80 points, then she receives £12 + £8
+ £5 = £25. The highest payment achievable (through strategic behavior)
is £29, whereas the lowest is £5.
4.3. Implementation
The experiment was conducted at the EssexLab facilities at the University
of Essex. The experiment took place during over the course of seven sessions
on July 5, 6, 12 and 13 of 2018. Most of the experiment participants are
undergraduate students.
10Subjects are only asked to provide a ranking for 2ACC, 2SCC, nLD and nDS. This
ranking was not asked for 3SC and 4EP because the fairness of these procedures can be
assessed via other questions, as we will discuss. The Appendix describes all the questions
asked.
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Figure 2: Distribution of payments.
Upon their arrival to the EssexLab, subjects were randomly assigned to
a computer. They signed a consent form and were given the experiment
instructions in a short presentation by the principal investigator (these are
provided in the Appendix). They were allowed to ask questions during and
after the instructions were given. After all questions had been answered, the
subjects were allowed to start the experiment. Subjects were not allowed
to communicate with anyone during the experiment. After the experiment
ended, subjects were paid in private and dismissed.
We had 136 participants. Unfortunately, 5 of the responses for the fairness
questionnaire could not be processed due to technical issues, so our total
sample for this part is only 131. Similarly, due to technical problems we lost
the observations of the actual cake cuts performed by 3 subjects, so our total
sample for this part is 133.
The average payment was £14. The highest payment was £28 and the
lowest was £5. The distribution of payments is shown in Figure 2. On
average, subjects took around 45 minutes to complete the experiment. There
was substantial variance in the time spent on the experiment, with some
subjects taking nearly two hours to finish.
5. Results
5.1. Fairness
We find evidence suggesting that envy-free procedures are considered
fairer than proportional ones. This evidence comes from two observations.
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First, when the subjects were asked specifically to rank each procedure on
the very fair to very unfair scale, 2ACC and 2SCC were considered fairer than
nDS and nLD. Whereas over 80% of our subjects considered the former two
to be fair or very fair (82% and 88% respectively), less than half considered
the latter two as fair or very fair (only 47% and 43%). A Wilcoxon signed-
rank test indicates that the fairness ranking of the first group of procedures
(2ACC and 2SCC) is statistically different (z = −9.332, p < 0.001) than
the one of the second group of procedures (nDS and nLD). Table 2 further
describes these statistics.
Table 2: Subjects’ views on fairness (131 subjects).
Very Fair Fair Unfair Very Unfair
2ACC 17 90 22 2
(13%) (69%) (17%) (2%)
2SCC 11 104 14 2
(8%) (79%) (11%) (2%)
nLD 4 58 63 6
(3%) (44%) (48%) (5%)
nDS 4 52 57 16
(3%) (40%) (44%) (12%)
Second, at the end of the experiment, when subjects stated their opinions
about which procedures produced the fairest allocations (they could list more
than one), 53 listed 2ACC, 37 listed 2SCC, and 36 listed 3SC. In contrast,
only 12, 11, and 4 chose 4EP, nDS, and nLD, respectively. The corresponding
graph appears in Figure 3. It is clear that the fact that the first three
produced envy-free allocations influenced their choices. For example, one
subject wrote: “the fairest of all the games was probably super fair, from
memory there was little deviation (sic) the results between all the players”.
Another subject explained: “I think the one with the two sliders was the
fairest. Everyone received the same amount, at least in my scenario as they
were all divided equally”.11
Thus, it is safe to conclude that:
Result 1. Subjects perceive 2ACC, 2SCC, and 3SC (all envy-free procedures)
11This comment is also related to a different fairness notion in the literature called
equitability. An allocation is equitable if each agent obtains the same proportion of the
cake as all other agents in his own view. This property is at odds with envy-freeness if
Pareto optimality is imposed (Brams et al., 2013).
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Figure 3: Which is the fairest procedure in practice?
as fairer than nLD, nDS, and nEP (all proportional procedures).
We also find that a higher fraction of our subjects (56% versus 44%)
said that they found 3SC fairer than all other procedures (including 2ACC
and 2SCC) when explicitly asked so, although we cannot guarantee that
such answering patterns differ from random choice (binomial one-sided test
p-value=0.11).12
We also asked subjects whether they would have preferred to directly
bargain with the other agents instead of participating in a centralized pro-
cedure. Since decentralized bargaining over the cake is always an option,
a centralized procedure should represent a guaranteed improvement on this
basic alternative. Surprisingly, most subjects said that they would have pre-
ferred to bargain in a decentralized fashion (48%), compared to 29% who
preferred some of the procedures in the experiment (the remaining 23% were
indifferent). Subjects seemed to think that bargaining would improve the
position of the agent receiving the worst piece of cake. One subject wrote:
“Sometimes. In some cases you could probably bargain and say: look, you
clearly got the best deal out of all of these, let me at least have one big catch”.
Subjects also emphasized the importance of common knowledge of prefer-
ences in the decentralized bargaining option: “If we could all see each others
12We also asked them if they found super fast to be any easier than all other proce-
dures. Most subjects (57% versus 43%) said no. We cannot assure that this difference is
statistically different from random choice (binomial one-sided test p-value=0.06).
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chocolate or coconut pieces then a direct negotiation would have been easier
to ensure fairness between parties. If all involved where still in the dark about
the opponents’ chocolate/coconut direct bargaining may not have made a dif-
ference”. Another subject wrote: “At least we get to know what everybody
wants and we can discuss to make the fairest share”.
5.2. Envy
Envy emerges in all of the division procedures, although at quite different
rates. We define envy as whether a subject prefers, in her own view, the piece
of cake received by another subject (even by one point; a robustness analysis
is carried out in the Appendix). The percentage of cases in which envy
emerges in each procedure is summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Percentage of cases where envy is generated, by round and on average
Round 1 2 3 4 5 No knowl. 6 7 Knowl. Total
Proc average average average
2ACC 10 8 8 5 8 8 5 3 4 7
2SCC 16 25 23 20 13 19 17 14 16 18
3DS 57 68 62 62 59 62 74 68 71 64
3LD 56 53 51 53 43 51 44 40 42 49
3SC 31 31 29 29 32 30 23 25 24 29
4DS 64 86 84 78 77 78 78 73 76 77
4LD 62 66 53 54 50 57 53 44 49 55
4EP 97 92 94 93 92 94 91 89 90 93
Envy may emerge in envy-free procedures due to two reasons. One is that
subjects strategically manipulate their cake cuts. Another is that subjects
did not understand the procedure. For example, in 2ACC, the simplest of
the procedures, envy was generated in 3% of the cases in the last round when
subjects knew their opponents’ preferences and were already familiar with
the division procedure. In these cases, envy was generated by mindless cake
cuts. The data for 2ACC suggest that this dull behavior rarely occurs. Most
of the envy is instead caused by strategic experimentation of the subjects,
and reduces once subjects know their opponents’ preferences in 2ACC and
2SCC. It is somewhat surprising that envy is generated in 2SCC, which we
observe is due to the fact that subjects follow the simple heuristic of copying
a manipulation strategy that was successful in the past (cut a bit further to
the right of the truthful cut).
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With the exception of 3SC, envy is generated in half or more of the cake
cuts in all procedures for 3 and 4 agents. In particular, envy is generated in
over 90% of the cases when 4EP is used. This finding is intriguing because
4EP was known to perform well with regards to envy in that it minimizes
the maximum number of players who can be envied among all proportional
procedures (Brams et al., 2011). It is interesting that subjects realize that
proportional procedures produce envy and that this observation is taken into
account when they rank the fairness of the allocations generated.
Overall, envy decreases after subjects learn their opponents’ preferences.
To see this, we conduct a logit regression for repeated measures of the prob-
ability of the emergence of envy on the round number. The associated co-
efficient is -0.04 and is statistically significant (p-value < 0.001). When we
look at each procedure specifically, we observe that envy increases with more
knowledge only for nDS (for 3DS is statistically significant, but for 4DS is
not).
We summarize these findings as follows.
Result 2. 2ACC, 2SCC, and 3SC (all envy-free procedures) generate sub-
stantially less envy than nLD, nDS, and nEP (all proportional procedures).
Overall envy decreases over time except in nDS.
5.3. Manipulation
The findings with respect to manipulation and learning can be previewed
in Figure 4, which presents the average number of points obtained in each
round, by procedure.
Figure 4: Average points obtained by the subjects in each round, by procedure.
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Figure 4 makes evident that subjects manipulate the procedures, even
before they have any information about their opponents’ preferences. The
average number of points obtained in the first round of 2ACC is 68, higher
than those obtained with a truthful report (60). Similarly, the average num-
ber of points in the first round of 3DS is 50, 10 points above those guaranteed
with a truthful report. However, the manipulation at such an early stage of
the game also has negative consequences: in the first round of 2SCC, the
average number of points obtained was 81, 9 points below the payoff with
truthful behavior. Similarly, in the first round of 4DS, the subjects obtain an
average payoff of 23 points, 7 below those guaranteed by truthful behavior.
Figure 5 presents the percentage of payoffs generated by truthful reports
(we define a truthful report as one generating a payoff within ±5 points of
the one corresponding to the suggestion given by the procedure; a robustness
analysis is carried out in the Appendix). We focus on payoffs and not on the
exact reports, which implies that we only analyze manipulations which affect
the subjects’ payoffs. Those that do not are inconsequential and thus we
ignore them in the main text (but discuss them in detail in the Appendix).13
Figure 5 shows that, in the first round, truth-telling exceeds strategic
behavior in only three procedures: 2SCC (69%), 3SC (65%), and 4EP (65%).
However, this percentage of truth-telling behavior quickly diminishes as sub-
jects learn their opponents’ preferences, as we will see in the next subsection.
Similarly, in rounds 6 and 7, when subjects are told their opponents’ pref-
erences directly, the percentage of truth-telling diminishes as well: it is only
above 50% for 4EP (52%). This finding suggests that subjects find it harder
to manipulate procedures that are more complicated such as 4EP. Subjects
successfully manipulate procedures as complicated as 3SC, an observation we
did not anticipate: over 55% of the subjects in rounds 6 and 7 successfully
manipulated 3SC.
It is also evident that the percentage of truth-telling behavior becomes
smaller in later rounds. To observe this, we conduct a logit regression for
repeated measures of the probability of playing truthful strategies on the
round number. The obtained coefficient is -0.1 (note the negative sign) and
is statistically significant (p-value < 0.001). Thus, we conclude that:
Result 3. Subjects manipulate (often unsuccessfully, and even without know-
13Because all other agents behave truthfully, it means that if we observe a payoff dif-
ferent to the one guaranteed by truth-telling, we can assure that the subject misreported
her preferences. Thus, the numbers reported are a lower bound on the total number of
manipulations, which only reinforces our point that procedures are very frequently ma-
nipulated.
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Figure 5: Percentage of truth-telling (red) and successful (green) and unsuccessful (blue)
manipulations over rounds, by procedure. Manipulations are defined as deviations over
5 points from truth-telling. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
ing their opponents’ preferences) all the division procedures, namely 2ACC,
2SCC, nLD, nDS, 4EP, and 3SC. Truth-telling decreases over time.
The previous result is in line with the findings of Hortala-Vallve and
Llorente-Saguer (2010) who, in a different fair division procedure, in which
two subjects vote for a series of issues, also document truthful behavior de-
creasing over time.
We also analyze the manipulation of the cake-cutting procedures by look-
ing at the actual position of the cake cuts made by subjects. The results are
very similar and thus postponed to the Appendix.
5.4. Learning
Does knowledge help? Knowing the opponents’ preferences helped the
subjects to earn more points only in 2ACC, 2SCC, 3SC, and 3LD (we com-
pare the number of points obtained in rounds 1-5 versus those obtained in
rounds 6-7, see Table 4). In the case of 3DS, knowledge actually hurts the
subjects, although the payoff difference is not statistically significant.
We find that most of the benefits of knowledge come from learning via ex-
perimentation. Table 5 shows that the payoffs obtained in round 5 compared
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Table 4: Average points obtained with and without knowledge of opponents’ preferences.
2ACC 2SCC 3DS 3LD 3SC 4DS 4EP 4LD
No knowledge 77 84 48 40 44 23 27 41
(665 instances)
Knowledge 87 88 45 46 49 25 28 43
(266 instances)
Difference 10 4 -3 6 6 2 1 2
p-value 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.20 0.20
We report the p-value for a t-test testing the null hypothesis that the difference is zero.
to those in round 1 are significantly higher in 2ACC, 2SCC, nLD and 3SC.
In comparison, revealing the opponents’ preferences directly (round 7) only
affects the payoffs obtained with the knowledge of experimentation (round
5) in 2ACC and 3SC, as shown in Table 6.
Table 5: Average points obtained in rounds 1 and 5.
2ACC 2SCC 3DS 3LD 3SC 4DS 4LD 4EP
Round 1 68 81 50 34 40 23 34 25
Round 5 82 91 50 45 44 24 45 28
Difference 14 10 0 11 5 1 8 3
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.05 0.66 0.01 0.07
We report the p-value for a t-test testing the null hypothesis that the difference is zero.
Table 6: Average points obtained in rounds 5 and 7.
2ACC 2SCC 3DS 3LD 3SC 4DS 4LD 4EP
Round 5 82 91 50 45 44 24 45 28
Round 7 89 91 46 47 50 26 46 29
Difference 7 0 -4 2 6 2 0 1
p-value 0.04 0.89 0.20 0.51 0.02 0.30 0.96 0.58
We report the p-value for a t-test testing the null hypothesis that the difference is zero.
To further asses the impact of learning by experimentation in the subjects’
payoffs, we conduct a regression for repeated measures of the scores on the
round number up to round 5. We find that the associated coefficient is 1.6
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and is statistically significant (p-value < 0.001). This confirms our finding
that subjects can figure out their opponents’ preferences via experimentation.
5.5. Quality of Learning
How good are people at learning the other agent’s valuations? To inves-
tigate this question we present a model of rational learning in 2ACC. We
consider 2ACC played for T rounds, where in each round, Alice cuts the
cake and Bob chooses a piece. Our model follows the experiment setup,
particularly:
• The game is discretized: the cake is [0, c] for some integer c (in the
experiment c = 600 is the number of pixels in the cake); Alice may cut
only in integer locations; a cut in x means that the left piece is [0, x]
and the right piece is [x+ 1, c].
• Bob is deterministic and non-strategic: he always picks the most valu-
able piece for him, and if the pieces have equal value, he breaks the tie
by selecting the left piece.
Alice’s payoff depends only on Bob’s half point — the integer h for which
vB(0, h) = vB(h + 1, c) = vB(0, c)/2. If Alice cuts at some x < h, then Bob
takes the right piece and she gets [0, x]; if Alice cuts at x ≥ h, then Bob
takes the left piece and she gets [x+ 1, c].
If Alice knows h, then it is optimal for her to cut either at h− 1 or at h;
in the former case she gets [0, h− 1] and in the latter case she gets [h+ 1, c].
Therefore Alice can guarantee to herself a utility of:
uopt(h) = max[vA(0, h− 1), vA(h+ 1, c)]
Initially, Alice does not know h, but she can learn the possible range of h from
Bob’s choices: if Alice cuts at some s ∈ [0, c] and Bob chooses the right piece,
she learns that h > s; similarly, if Alice cuts at t ∈ [0, c] and Bob chooses the
left piece, Alice learns that h ≤ t. In each round, Alice’s knowledge about
Bob is summarized by two numbers s < t that represent the lower and upper
bounds for Bob’s half-point h, i.e., s < h ≤ t. With this knowledge, cutting
at any x < s is dominated by cutting at x = s (since in both cases Alice will
get [0, x]), and cutting at any x > t is dominated by cutting at x = t (since
in both cases Alice will get [x+ 1, c]). We say that Alice is rational if all her
cuts (from the second round onwards) are undominated.
In 2SCC a similar analysis is applicable. Although in this case Bob does
not choose, the game chooses for him the right or the left piece depending
on whether Alice cuts at x < h or at x ≥ h. Alice is told what piece she
receives, so she can learn the possible range for h in the same manner.
27
Undominated actions in rounds 2–7 Rational players
2ACC 487/795 = 61.3% 32/133 = 24.1%
2SCC 447/795 = 56.2% 23/133 = 17.3%
Table 7: Number and percentage of undominated strategies and rational subjects in the
two-agent procedures.
Our findings regarding rational agents and the use of undominated strate-
gies in the experiment are summarized in Table 7. Interestingly, in both
games, only about 60% of all cuts are undominated, and only about 20% of
all players are fully rational (i.e. all their actions are undominated). While
this finding is in line with previous studies showing that human subjects of-
ten play dominated strategies (Artemov et al., 2017; Hassidim et al., 2016,
2017; Rees-Jones, 2017; Parco and Rapoport, 2004), we find it somewhat
surprising that so many people behave in a way that is so clearly irrational.
5.6. Time
Our software recorded the exact time at which each cake cut was made.
This allows us to compare the time that subjects spent on each procedure,
which we use as a proxy of the perceived complexity of the procedure. This
proxy is noisy, as the order in which subjects use the procedures is fixed, and
thus procedures that appear first may take longer than those that appear later
simply because the subjects take some time to get used to the experiment
interface. Another source of noise is that the time is counted from the time
subjects make the cake cut in the first round until they made the last one in
round seven, and thus does not count the time that subjects spend reading
the instructions of each procedure before they click start. Nevertheless, we
believe this data is still informative, and thus we present an overview of it in
Figure 6.
As expected, the first procedure that subjects face (2ACC) is the one
in which they spend most time. However, it is interesting that for 2ACC,
nDS and 4EP subjects spend almost twice as much time as for nLD, 2SCC,
and 3SC. We do not observe that the procedures that appear later in the
experiment take less time to be completed overall.
It is intriguing that, even though nLD and nDS are theoretically equiva-
lent, subjects spent more time on nDS than on nLD. This finding is robust
(it occurs in both the 3 and 4 agents case) and significant (the corresponding
p-value for a t-test testing the null hypothesis that the difference in time
spent in both procedures is zero is 0.000 in both cases). Given that nLD also
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Figure 6: Average time spent in each procedure, in seconds. Procedures are displayed in
order in which they are faced by subjects.
generates less envy than nDS in both the 3 and 4 agents case, our findings
suggest that overall nLD performs better in practice than nDS.
6. Conclusion
The envy-freeness of the Selfridge-Conway procedure can only be guar-
anteed when agents do not manipulate the cake-cutting procedures. In the
lab, we find that this is a real concern, as subjects very often report their
preferences untruthfully. Nevertheless, the Selfridge-Conway procedure is
perceived as significantly fairer than other proportional procedures. Fur-
thermore, it generates substantially less envy in objective terms. We draw
our conclusions from a lab experiment involving the following (proportional)
cake-cutting procedures: Asymmetric cut-and-choose, Symmetric cut-and-
choose, Dubins-Spanier, Last diminisher, Even-Paz, and Selfridge-Conway.
Our experiment provides the first empirical evidence supporting the real-
life application of the celebrated Selfridge-Conway cake-cutting procedure.
We hope that our findings guide its practical implementation, in the light of
the very successful implementations of other fair division protocols in online
platforms such as Spliddit.com.
Three interesting directions for future experiments are: (a) Check other
cake-cutting procedures, in particular, procedures that guarantee additional
properties such as equitability, truthfulness or Pareto-efficiency. Is the added
complexity of these procedures justified? Do they yield a better user ex-
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perience? (b) Compare the performance of structured cake-cutting proce-
dures to unstructured face-to-face bargaining, which many of our subjects
suggested to be better (subsection 5.1). (c) Check division of more realis-
tic resources. For example, instead of showing the subjects artificial one-
dimensional “cakes”, one can show them real two-dimensional maps of land-
estates. Fair division of land is an important issue in many inheritance and
dissolution cases. How can cake-cutting procedures be used to solve such
issues in practice?
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Appendix 1: Robustness Tests
Envy. In the main text we classified a cake division as envious as long as
the subject obtained fewer points than any other agent (i.e. preferred the
piece of cake received by any other agent over hers). We found that envy-
free procedures (2ACC, 2SCC, 3SC) produced significantly less envy than
proportional ones. We also found that 4EP produced envy in most cases.
Here, we changed the definition of envy as a robustness test. We say that
the subject envies an agent only if the number of points obtained by the
subject plus some number x is smaller than the number of points received
by the agent, where x is either 5 or 10. We refer to these cases as envy (+5)
or envy (+10). For example, if the subject obtained 50 points but another
subject obtained 53, we would say that the agent is envious in the main text
but not in this robustness test.
Table 8 presents an overview of our findings with this updated definition
of envy (+5). We do not present the results for envy (+10) as they are almost
identical.
Table 8: Percentage of cases where envy (+5) is generated, by round.
Round 1 2 3 4 5 No knowl. 6 7 Knowl. Total
Proc average average average
2ACC 10 8 5 5 6 7 5 3 4 6
2SCC 16 24 23 20 13 19 16 14 15 18
3DS 56 67 62 60 57 60 72 68 70 63
3LD 55 51 49 52 42 50 44 40 42 48
3SC 27 23 24 26 30 26 23 23 23 25
4DS 61 85 83 77 76 76 77 72 75 76
4LD 61 64 52 53 49 56 53 44 49 54
4EP 93 86 90 87 86 88 88 83 86 88
We observe that all proportional procedures still generate envy in half or
more of the cases. We observe that 3SC generates substantially less envy
than 3LD and 3DS. Similarly, we observe that 4EP is by far the procedure
that generates more envy. Thus we conclude that our findings regarding envy
are robust to the exact definition of envy.
Manipulations. In the main text we defined manipulations as deviations
within 5 score points. Here, as robustness tests, we define manipulations
as deviations within 10 and 15 points. We first present the percentage of
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truthful behavior, and of successful and unsuccesful manipulations in Fig-
ures 7a and 7b, respectively. The conclusions presented in the main text still
apply: we observe a large number of scores obtained by both the successful
and unsuccessful manipulation of preferences.
(a) Manipulations ±10 points (b) Manipulations ±15 points
Figure 7: Percentage of truth-telling (red) and successful (green) and unsuccessful (blue)
manipulations, by procedure. Manipulations are defined as deviations ± 10 (a) and 15
(b) points from truth-telling. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
We check in both cases whether the number of non-truthful reports in-
creases as agents learn more about their opponents’ preferences. We found
that this was the case in the main text. We conduct a logit regression for re-
peated measures of the probability of playing truthful strategies (under both
definitions) on the round number. For the case of manipulations within 10
points, we obtain a coefficient of -.11 that is statistically significant (p-value
< 0.001). For the case of manipulations within 15 points, we obtain simi-
lar results (a coefficient of -.1 with a p-value < 0.001). Thus, we conclude
that our finding that truthful play decreases over time is robust to the exact
definition of truthful behavior.
Manipulations: Looking at Cake Cuts instead of Utilities. In the main text we
identified manipulations by looking at changes in the utilities of the subjects.
We found evidence of strategic behavior in all procedures. Here we take the
alternative route of looking at the actual cake cuts that subjects made. We
have this data based on the exact pixel that subjects choose to cut the cake.
We give a ± 5 pixels deviation tolerance. These results are presented in
Figure 8, in which we describe the percentage of truthful cake cuts (since in
some procedures the agents need to make more than one cut, we examine
only the truthfulness of the first cut).
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Figure 8: Percentage of truthful cake cuts, by procedure over rounds.
We observe that our main finding is robust: we still observe that agents
make strategic cake cuts most of the times. However, we observe one dif-
ference with respect to the analysis of utilities. In the case of utilities, we
observe truthful behavior in about 50% of the cases, whereas if we look at
cake cuts, we observe that truth-telling only occurs in about 10% of cases.
Looking at utilities does not allow us to identify a large number of manipula-
tions which are payoff irrelevant in the case of 4EP. For the other procedures,
examining manipulation via utilities or cake cuts leads to similar conclusions.
We also perform a logit regression for repeated measures of the probability
of playing truthful strategies (using cake cuts) on the round number. The
results are very similar as in the previous cases: the corresponding coefficient
is -0.11 and is statistically significant (p-value < 0.001).
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Appendix 2: Preference Profiles Used
All the preference profiles are generated using piecewise uniform valua-
tions. The cake is divided in 600 pixels of equal length with each desired
pixel giving the agent 1 point. Agents desire 120 pixels which give the corre-
sponding 120 points described in the main text. We present the preferences
using the tables below; a one in the table indicates that the agent desires the
interval in question. The intervals that are not mentioned are not desired by
any agent. These can also be downloaded from our website in a spreadsheet,
which may be easier to read.
Table 9: Preferences used in 2ACC.
2ACC 61-120 121-130 171-190 291-310 411-430 451-540
Subject 1 0 1 1 1 0
Robot 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Table 10: Preferences used in 2SCC.
2SCC 141-170 191-220 231-240 241-260 271-300 311-320 321-330 361-390 471-490 511-540
Subject 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Robot 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Table 11: Preferences used in 3DS.
3DS 71-110 121-130 131-150 151-160 171-180 191-200 271-310 311-380 411-430 451-540
Subject 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Robot 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Robot 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Table 12: Preferences used in 4DS.
4DS 61-80 81-90 91-120 141-150 151-170 171-180 181-210 211-240 241-270 271-300 301-330 331-360 371-390 391-420 421-450 451-480 491-510 511-540
Subject 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Robot 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Robot 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Robot 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
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Table 13: Preferences used in 3LD.
3LD 71-90 91-110 121-190 221-230 231-260 281-300 301-320 341-350 351-370 371-400 401-410 431-440 451-460
Subject 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Robot 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robot 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
Table 14: Preferences used in 4LD.
4LD 61-90 91-110 111-160 181-230 231-250 251-270 271-280 281-290 311-340 341-350 351-370 371-380 381-410 421-520
Subject 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robot 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Robot 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
Robot 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table 15: Preferences used in 4EP.
4EP 91-110 111-120 121-140 161-170 171-190 191-210 211-220 221-240 241-270 281-300 301-320 331-340 341-350 351-360 361-370 411-430 471-510
Subject 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robot 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Robot 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
Robot 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
Table 16: Preferences used in 3SC.
3SC 71-80 81-90 91-100 101-110 141-150 151-170 171-190 211-230 271-280 281-290 291-300 301-320 321-330 331-340 381-400 451-470 471-490
Subject 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Robot 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Robot 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
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Appendix 3: Experiment Instructions
Upon their arrival to the EssexLab, the cake-cutting procedures are ex-
plained to the subjects using the slides available at www.josueortega.com.
We do not include them here for the sake of brevity. The presentation com-
prises 31 slides so to make the procedures as clear as possible.
We describe the text that the subjects observe in the graphical interface
(which can also be downloaded from the previous link). These are as follows:
Welcome to the game. When you are ready to start click the start button.
First tab: I Cut You choose, against 1 opponent. Description: You will cut
the cake into two parts. Your opponent will choose the one he prefers. You
will receive the other one. Suggestion: If you cut the cake in two pieces worth
60 points, you guarantee that you will receive 60 points. Dividing the cake
differently may give you more points, but may also give you less.
Second tab: Cut Middle, against 1 opponent. Description: You will cut the
cake into two parts. Your opponent also cuts the cake into two. We cut the
cake in the middle of those cuts and you get the part that includes your cut.
Suggestion: If you cut the cake in two pieces worth 60 points, you guarantee
that you will receive at least 60 points. Dividing the cake differently may
give you more points, but may also give you less.
Third tab: Leftmost Leaves, against 2 opponents. Description: All players
make one cut to the cake. The one who cuts the leftmost piece gets that
part and leaves. The procedure is repeated until no agent is left. You may
need to cut the cake twice in the same round if you don’t choose the leftmost
piece right away. Suggestion: If you cut the cake at 40 in each stage, you
guarantee at least 40 points. Dividing the cake differently may give you more
points, but may also give you less.
Fourth tab: Leftmost Leaves, against 3 opponents. Description: All players
make one cut to the cake. The one who cuts the leftmost piece gets that
part and leaves. The procedure is repeated until no agent is left. You may
need to cut the cake twice in the same round if you don’t choose the leftmost
piece right away. Suggestion: If you cut the cake at 30 in each stage, you
guarantee at least 30 points. Dividing the cake differently may give you more
points, but may also give you less.
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Fifth tab: Last Challenger, against 2 opponents. Description: You make a
cut to the cake. This cut can be challenged by other players. If it is not
challenged, you get the left piece of the cake and leave. If it is challenged,
the player who challenges gets the left piece and leaves, and we restart the
procedure with the leftover cake. You may need to cut the cake twice in
the same round if your initial cut is challenged. Suggestion: If you cut the
cake at 40 in each stage, you guarantee at least 40 points. Dividing the cake
differently may give you more points, but may also give you less.
Sixth tab: Last Challenger, against 3 opponents. Description: You make a
cut to the cake. This cut can be challenged by other players. If it is not
challenged, you get the left piece of the cake and leave. If it is challenged,
the player who challenges gets the left piece and leaves, and we restart the
procedure with the leftover cake. You may need to cut the cake twice in
the same round if your initial cut is challenged. Suggestion: If you cut the
cake at 30 in each stage, you guarantee at least 30 points. Dividing the cake
differently may give you more points, but may also give you less.
Seventh tab: Super Fast, against 3 opponents. Description: All players split
the cake into two. The two who choose the leftmost cuts divide the first half,
the other two the second half. Each half is divided using leftmost leaves.
You will have to cut the cake twice. Suggestion: If you first cut the cake at
60 points and then at 30, you guarantee at least 30 points. Dividing the cake
differently may give you more points, but may also give you less.
Eight tab: Super Fair, against 2 opponents. Description: In this procedure
you have two knives. You should cut the cake into three pieces. Then a
complex procedure occurs, which you can read in your information sheet.
Suggestion: If you cut the cake into three pieces worth 40 points each, you
guarantee 40 points. Dividing the cake differently may give you more points,
but may also give you less.
Additional Explanation for 3SC. You will cut the cake into three pieces using
two knives. We suggest you to cut the cake into three pieces worth 40 points
each so to guarantee yourself 40 points. Dividing the cake differently may
give you more points, but may also give you less.
After you cut the cake, opponent 1 will trim her most valued piece so
to make her two most preferred pieces of equal value. The part she cuts
from her most valued piece of cake will be put apart and divided later (the
trimmings). Then opponent 2 will take the part he prefers. If opponent 2
does not take the part that opponent 1 trims, then opponent 1 will receive
that part and you will receive the leftover. Otherwise, in case opponent 2
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picks the trimmed part, opponent 1 chooses one of the two remaining pieces
and then you choose last.
Once the main pieces of the cake have been divided, we will divide the
trimmings. One of the two opponents (the one who did not choose the
trimmed part) will cut the trimmings into three pieces. Then the other op-
ponent will choose one of them. From the two leftovers, you will be given
the one which is best for you, and the last one will be given to the remaining
opponent.
Subjects also receive an official information sheet with the following in-
formation:
Strategic Behavior in Fair Division Problems
Invitation to our study. We would like to invite you to participate in this
research project. You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to
take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether
you want to take part, it is important for you to read the following infor-
mation carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is
anything that is not clear or you would like more information.
Background on the project. We are conducting an exploration of how people
make economic decisions, in particular on how they decide to divide and
share resources with others. We are testing how different resource allocation
methods affect the economic decisions people make.
Experiment. You will be asked to divide resources with 2, 3, or 4 other agents.
The way in which you decide to divide the resources will affect how much
money you will receive by the end of the experiment. The experiment will
last for around one hour. You wont be required to participate again in the
experiment. You will be paid in private at the end of the experiment. You
will receive at least £5 for showing up, but you may earn more money based
on your decisions throughout this session.
Are there any risks associated with this experiment?. There are no risks as-
sociated with this experiment. Shall you experience any discomfort please
contact any member of the staff.
Informed consent. Should you agree to take part in this experiment, you will
be asked to sign a consent form before the experiment commences.
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Withdrawal. Your participation is voluntary and you will be free to withdraw
from the project at any time without giving any reason and without penalty.
If you wish to withdraw, you simply need to notify the principal investigator
(see contact details below). If any data have already been collected, upon
withdrawal, your data will be destroyed, unless you inform the principal
investigator that you are happy for us to use such data for the scientific
purposes of the project.
Data gathered. We will record the economic decisions you make during the
experiment, namely how you decide to share resources with other partici-
pants. Signed consent forms will be kept separately from individual experi-
mental data and locked in a drawer until the end of the project.
Findings. After the end of the project, we will publish the findings of our
research. We will be happy to provide you with a lay summary of the main
findings and with copies of the articles published if you express an interest.
Concerns and complaints. If you have any concerns about any aspect of
the study or you have a complaint, in the first instance please contact the
principal investigator of the project (see contact details below). If are still
concerned or you think your complaint has not been addressed to your satis-
faction, please contact the Director of Research in the principal investigators
department (see below). If you are still not satisfied, please contact the
Universitys Research Governance and Planning Manager (Sarah Manning-
Press).
Funding. The research is funded by the EssexLab of the University of Essex.
Ethical approval. This project has been reviewed on behalf of the University
of Essex Ethics Committee and had been given approval.
Principal investigator. Dr. Josue Ortega, Lecturer, Department of Eco-
nomics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, CO4 3SQ, Colchester,
josue.ortega@essex.ac.uk.
Co-investigators. Dr. Maria Kyropoulou, Lecturer, Department of Com-
puter Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex Wivenhoe
Park, CO4 3SQ, Colchester, maria.kyropoulou@essex.ac.uk.
Dr. Erel Segal-Halevi, Lecturer, Department of Computer Science, Ariel
University, Ramat HaGolan St 65, Ari’el, erelsgl@gmail.com
Director of Research, Economics Department. Prof. Friederike Mengel, Pro-
fessor, Department of Economics, University of Essex Wivenhoe Park, CO4
3SQ, Colchester, fmengel@essex.ac.uk.
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Research Governance and Planning Manager. Sarah Manning-Press, Univer-
sity of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, CO4 3SQ, Colchester, sarahm@essex.ac.uk.
Finally, we include the questions in the fairness survey that subjects com-
plete after they complete the cutting of all the cakes.
Experiment feedback. Please answer (with as many details as possible) the
following questions.
How fair was “Cut and choose”? Very unfair, Unfair, Fair, Very fair.
Feedback: textbox.
How fair was “middle cut”? Very unfair, Unfair, Fair, Very fair.
Feedback: textbox.
How fair was “last challenger”? Very unfair, Unfair, Fair, Very fair.
Feedback: textbox.
How fair was “lefmost leaves”? Very unfair, Unfair, Fair, Very fair.
Feedback: textbox.
In your opinion, was “super fair” a fairer procedure than all the others? Yes,
No.
Feedback: textbox.
In your opinion, was “super fast” an easier procedure to use than all the
others? Yes, No.
Feedback: textbox.
Would you have preferred to bargain over the cake directly with the other
players instead of dividing it with these methods? Yes, No, Doesn’t matter.
Please give us your comments on which procedures produced fairer alloca-
tions and were easier to use.
Feedback: textbox.
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Appendix 4: Omitted Proofs
We present the proofs omitted in the main text.
Lemma (3). The procedures 2ACC, 2SCC, nDS, nLD, nEP, 3SC are n−1
n
strategy-proof and this is tight.
Proof of Lemma 3. To prove that  = n−1
n
is tight, we provide instances
such that an agent would get utility exactly 1/n by truthfully reporting her
valuation function, while she could get utility 1 by strategizing.
We start with the case of 3SC. Consider a cake [0, 1] and the following
valuations of the agents: v1(0, 1/3) = v2(1/3, 2/3) = v3(2/3, 1) = 1; agents
have valuation 0 for any other part. Assume everyone behaves truthfully,
and in the first step agent 1 divides the cake in the following parts of equal
value to him: [0, 1/9), [1/9, 2/9), and [2/9, 1]. Agent 2 has positive valuation
only for the last part, so in the next step, she will trim it so that the trimmed
part has value 0 to him; let’s assume that the trimmed part is negligible and
has value 0 to everyone. Agent 3 now has to select one of the parts for which
she is indifferent (she only values the trimmings), so let him select the part
[1/9, 2/9), let agent 2 take the trimmed part, and let agent 1 get the [0, 1/9)
part. Agent 3 will now divide the trimmings so that each part is worth 1/3
to him, namely (2/9, 7/9), [7/9, 8/9), and [8/9, 1]. Agent 2 will rationally
select the first one of these parts, leaving agent 1 with an overall utility of
1/3, after the end of the process.
Now imagine that agent 1 behaves strategically in the first step and di-
vides the cake into the parts [0, 1/3), [1/3, 2/3), and [2/3, 1]. Agent 2 will
trim the second part so that the trimmed part is negligible, i.e. it is worth 0
to everyone. Agent 3 will rationally get her desired part, i.e. [2/3, 1], agent 2
will get the trimmed part, and agent 1 will get her desired part, i.e. [0, 1/3).
Now, let agent 3 divide the trimmings as follows (recall that she is indifferent
because the trimmings are worth 0 to him): one part is (1/3, 2/3), and the
other parts are negligible. Agent 2 will now rationally select this first part in
the next step and, overall, each agent gets utility 1 in this case where only
agent 1 strategizes.
Regarding 2SCC, consider a cake [0, 1] and the following valuations of the
agents, where  > 0 is negligibly small: v1(0, 1/4) = v1(1/2−2, 1/2−) = 12 ,
and v2(1/2, 1/2 + ) = v2(1/2 + , 1/2 + 2) =
1
2
; agents have valuation 0
for any other part. Assume everyone behaves truthfully, and agents 1 and
2 cut the cake at points 1/4 and 1/2 + , respectively, to divide it to two
parts of equal value to them. After the end of the procedure agent 1 will
receive utility 1/2. Now imagine that agent 1 behaves strategically and cuts
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the cake at 1/2− . In the resulting allocation each of the agents will receive
utility 1.
The other cases are simpler and use instances with valuation functions of
the form vi(
i−1
n
, i
n
) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n, and 0 otherwise, similar to 3SC. The
analysis is straightforward (similar, yet much simpler than the one for 3SC),
hence we omit it.
Lemma (4). Envy can be generated in 3SC with just one agent misrepre-
senting her preferences. This agent achieves a higher payoff at the cost of
being envious.
Proof of Lemma 4, cont’d. Recall that the cake [0, 1] comprises 6 parts. The
preferences of the agents are described by the valuations in the table below;
agents are assumed to have uniform valuations within each of these parts. 
denotes a very small positive constant.
Table: Agents’ preferences such that under 3SC agent 1 has an equilibrium strategy which
(maximizes her utility, but) makes her envious.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Agent 1 0 1/3  1/3−   1/3− 
Agents 2 and 3 1/6 1/6 1/3 0 1/3 0
It remains to show that the split in pieces 1-4, 5, and 6 is an equilibrium
strategy (the one that results in the highest utility) for agent 1.
We first need to make some assumptions regarding the behavior of the
agents (these assumptions also help so that the tie-breaking between equiv-
alent truthful actions of agents 2 and 3 is consistent). We first assume that
agents cannot cut in the interior of parts 1, 2, 3 and 5 (the instance could
be defined so that these parts have a negligibly small width and the space
of allowed cuts is discrete); for the smooth execution of the protocol we al-
low such cuts if and only if it is absolutely necessary in order to achieve an
exact trimmed piece or an even distribution of trimmings. For consistency
when trimming, we assume that the trimmings will be on the left part of the
trimmed piece, unless a cut in the interior of the parts mentioned above can
be avoided otherwise. Finally, among equivalent actions agents 2 and 3 will
choose the one that harms agent 1 the most.
To see why the split in pieces 1-4, 5, and 6 is an equilibrium strategy for
agent 1 we show that 4/9− is the maximum utility she can get, by examining
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all other possible cuts she could make at the beginning of the procedure. Let
c1 and c2 denote the cuts of agent 1, T denote the trimmings, and t1 and t2
denote the cuts that divide the trimmings. We denote by ci ∈ P , for i = 1, 2
the fact that the i-th cut is in part P (or on its boundary), and we denote
by rj, lj the right and left boundary, respectively, of part j, for j = 1, . . . , 6.
• c1, c2 ∈ 6. Under our tie-breaking assumptions, T = [0, c1) and agent
1 will get the least valuable piece among [c1, c2) and [c2, 1] before the
splitting of the trimmings. T will be split by t1 = l3 and t2 = 1/3 +
c1−1/3
2
, and agent 1 will also get her second most valuable part of T. In
total, agent 1 will get at most 1−c1
2
+ c1−1/3
2
≤ 1/3.
• c1 ∈ 4, c2 ∈ 6. T comprises parts 1-2 and agent 1 will get part [c2, 1]
before the splitting of the trimmings. T will be split in three equal
parts, for which agent 1 will have value 0, 1/9, and 2/9, respectively.
Agent 1 will get her second most valuable part of T, and overall her
allocation has value at most 1
3
− + 1
9
= 4
9
− .
• c1, c2 ∈ 4. T comprises parts 1-2 and agent 1 will get piece [c1, c2)
before the splitting of the trimmings. Similarly to the previous case,
agent 1 will gain value 1/9 from the trimmings which gives him at most
4
9
−  in total.
• c1 = l3, c2 ∈ 6. T = (c1, r3) and agent 1 gets [c2, 1] before the splitting
of the trimmings. Agent 1 gets value less than 1/3 in total.
• c1 = l3, c2 ∈ 4. No trimming is required. Agent 1 will get value at most
1/3.
• c1 = l2, c2 ∈ 6. T = [l3, c2) and agent 1 gets [c2, 1] before the splitting of
the trimmings, worth less than 1/3 to her. One part of the trimmings
will contain part 4, and that part will be chosen first by the agent
among 2 and 3 who got the trimmed part. Overall, agent 1 gets value
less than 1/3 in total.
• c1 = l2, c2 ∈ 4. T = (c1, r2) and agent 1 gets [0, c1] before the splitting
of the trimmings, worth 0 to her. Agent 1 gets value less than 1/3 in
total.
• c1 = l2, c2 = r2. T = (c2, z), where z is in the middle of part 5 and
agent 1 gets [0, c1] before the splitting of the trimmings, worth 0 to her.
t2 is in the middle of part 3 and t3 = r3, and agent 1 will not get the
part of the trimmings containing part 4. Hence, agent 1 gets value less
than 1/3 in total.
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• c1 = l1, c2 ∈ 6. T = (c1, c2) and agent 1 gets [0, c1) before the splitting
of the trimmings, worth 0 to her. t1 = l3 and t2 = r4 which means that
agent 1 cannot get more than 1/3 in total.
• c1 = l1, c2 ∈ 4. T = (c1, r2) and agent 1 gets [0, c1) before the splitting
of the trimmings, worth 0 to her. Agent 1 cannot get more than 1/3
in total.
• c1 = l1, c2 = r2. T = [c2, r3] and agent 1 gets [0, c1) before the splitting
of the trimmings, worth 0 to her. Agent 1 cannot get more than 1/3
in total.
• c1 = l1, c2 = r1. T = [l3, 1] and agent 1 gets [0, c1) before the splitting
of the trimmings, worth 0 to her. t1 ∈ 3 and t2 ∈ 5 imply that agent 1
cannot get more than 1/3 in total.
The proof is now complete.
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